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Abstract
This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be sub-
stitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or
separate, rms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for
the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. When products
are partial substitutes, this typically gives an integrated rm a greater incentive to
o¤er a bundle discount (relative to the standard model with additive preferences),
while product substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to
o¤er inter-rm discounts. When separate sellers negotiate their inter-rm discount,
they can use the discount to relax subsequent competition.
1 Introduction
Bundling the practice whereby consumers are o¤ered a discount if they buy several dis-
tinct products is used widely by rms, and is the focus of a rich economic literature.
However, most of the existing literature discusses the phenomenon under relatively restric-
tive assumptions, namely: (i) a consumers valuation for a bundle of several products is
the sum of her valuations for consuming the items in isolation, and (ii) bundle discounts
are only o¤ered for products sold by the same rm. The two assumptions are related, in
that when valuations are additive it is less often the case that a rm would wish to reduce
its price to a customer who also buys a product from another seller. This paper analyzes
the incentive to engage in bundling, and the consequent impact on prices and prots, when
one or both of these assumptions is relaxed.
I am very grateful to two referees and a co-editor, as well as to Jonathan Baker, Duarte Brito, John
Thanassoulis, Helder Vasconcelos, John Vickers and Jidong Zhou for many helpful comments, and to the
Economic and Social Research Council (UK) for funding assistance.
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There are very many situations in which modelling products as substitutes is relevant.
For instance, when visiting a city a tourist may gain some extra utility from visiting art
gallery A if she has already visited art gallery B, but the incremental utility is likely to be
smaller than if she were only to visit A. Joint purchase discounts (or premia) on products
o¤ered by separate sellers are rarer, though several examples can be found, including:
 A tourist may be able to buy a city pass, so that she can visit all participating
tourist attractions at a discount on the sum of individual entry fees. Most major
tourist cities have such schemes, either organized as a joint venture by the attractions
themselves, or implemented by one or more third parties who put together their own
bundles given the wholesale fees they negotiate with attractions.1
 Bundling is prevalent in markets for transport services. Sometimes customers can
obtain inter-rm bundling discounts, as is the case with alliances between airlines,
when di¤erent rms coordinate to o¤er a travel passin a city, or when neighboring
ski-lifts agree to o¤er a combined ticket.2
 Online music stores retail music by many di¤erent publishers to nal consumers, often
using bundling discounts.3 Separately-owned television channels may be retailed
separately as well as being o¤ered as a bundle to viewers. Separately owned academic
journals are marketed individually, and as part of a collection, to libraries.4
 Pharmaceuticals are sometimes used in isolation and sometimes as part of a cocktail
with one or more drugs supplied by other rms. Drugs companies can set di¤erent
prices depending on whether the drug is used on a stand-alone basis or in a cocktail.
(One way to do this is for a rm to use a di¤erent name for the same chemical in
1An interesting example at the time of writing is the website www.smartdestinations.com (visited on
June 30, 2011), which allows tourists to put together their own bundle of attractions for a number of
American cities. Each bundle is sold at discount on the sum of individual entry fees, with the proportional
discount typically increasing with the number of attractions chosen.
2In fact, in a famous antitrust case concerning ski-lifts in the Aspen resort, one ski-lift operator success-
fully sued another for not permitting it to participate in an inter-rm bundling scheme. See Easterbrook
(1986) for further details.
3For some background to this market, see Shiller and Waldfogel (2009). While many distributors do
use bundling schemes, including at-rate schemes with unlimited downloads, for many years the market
leader, Apples iTunes music store, retailed every song at $0.99, regardless of the song or how many other
songs were purchased.
4For background to this market, as well as a discussion of the merits and problems involved in bundling
schemes involving separately-owned journals, see Armstrong (2010).
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two di¤erent uses, and to obtain regulatory approval for one name to be used in the
cocktail and the other name to be used for stand-alone treatment.)
 Products supplied by separately-owned rms are often marketed together, with dis-
counts for joint purchase. Thus, supermarkets and gasoline stations may cooperate
to o¤er a discount when both services are consumed. Airlines and car rental rms
may link up for marketing purposes, and sometimes credit cards o¤er discounts pro-
portional to spend towards designated ights or hotels. Currently, Amazon.co.uk
o¤ers its customers discounts (in the form of vouchers enclosed when its books are
delivered) for seemingly unrelated products (such as wine) o¤ered by independent
sellers.
 Marketing data obtained by a rm may reveal useful information about a potential
customers purchase history which a¤ects the rms price o¤er to the customer. For
instance, information that the customer has chosen to buy another rms product 1
may induce the supplier of product 2 to discount its price, and an inter-rm discount
for the joint purchase of the two products is implemented. In this situation the
bundle discount is not announced ex ante and, depending on the sophistication of
consumers, not anticipated either.5
 At a wholesale level, one manufacturer may o¤er a retailer a discount on its product
if the retailer does not also purchase a rival manufacturers product. (Such contracts
are termed loyalty contractsor market share discounts.) This is a situation in
which there is joint purchase premium instead of a discount.
Although several of these examples involve a degree of coordination between sellers to
achieve bundle discounts, in this paper (until section 6) I consider the extent to which
rms can implement an inter-rm discount without recourse to coordination. That is,
a rm unilaterally chooses two prices: a price for buying its product on its own, and a
(lower) price if the consumer also buys the other rms product. As I discuss later in the
5Taylor (2004) analyzes a model where two sellers interact sequentially with consumers, and where the
second rm can base its price on whether the consumer previously purchased the other product. In his
framework, valuations for the two products are additive but positively correlated. This implies that the
second rm sets a higher price to those customers who also bought the other rms product, so there is
a joint-purchase premium. However, his model could easily be adapted to allow for negative correlation
in valuations or a degree of substitution between the two products, which could induce the second rm to
o¤er a discount to those customers who also buy the other product.
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paper, historically it has often been hard for two separate sellers to implement an inter-rm
discount without coordination, but technological advances in selling procedures mean that
it is now easier for rms to introduce a discount non-cooperatively.
In more detail, the plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I briey recapitulate
the approach to bundling presented in Long (1984), which is used as a major ingredient
for my analysis in the rest of the paper. In section 3, I present a fairly general analysis of
the incentive to introduce bundling discounts, both with integrated and separate supply.
In broad terms, there is a motive to o¤er a bundle discount when consumer demand for
the bundle is elastic compared to demand for stand-alone items.
In section 4, I consider in more detail the case where an integrated rm supplies both
products, and specialise to the case where products are symmetric. An integrated rm has
an incentive to bundle whenever the proportion of those consumers who buy a product
at price p and who go on to buy the other product at the same price decreases with p.
Relative to the situation with additive preferences, the integrated rm typically has a
greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when products are substitutable. Because the
purchase of one product can decrease a consumers incremental utility from the second
item, the rm has a direct incentive to reduce the price for a second item, in addition to
the rent-extraction motive for bundling familiar from the existing literature. In examples
we see that the size of the discount can be above or below the corresponding discount with
additive preferences.
In section 5 I turn to the situation where products are supplied by separate sellers.
When valuations are additive, a rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a bundle discount
when valuations for products are negatively correlated. When products are substitutes,
whether a rm has a unilateral incentive to introduce a discount depends on the way
that preferences are modelled. When there is a constant disutility of joint consumption,
separate sellers typically wish to o¤er a joint-purchase discount: the fact that a customer
has purchased the rival product implies that her incremental valuation for the rms own
item has fallen, and this usually implies that the rm would like to reduce its price to this
customer. Alternatively, if a proportion of buyers only want a single item (for instance,
a tourist in a city might only have time to visit a single museum) while other consumers
have additive preferences, separate sellers would like, if feasible, to charge a premium
when a customer also buys the rival product. In the examples solved, when this form of
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price discrimination is permitted, one price increases and the other decreases relative to
the situation with uniform pricing, and price discrimination results in higher equilibrium
prot.
Finally, in section 6 I investigate partial coordination between separate sellers. (Earlier
parts of the paper consider the two polar cases where separate sellers did not coordinate
their tari¤s at all and in the integrated rm analysis where the two suppliers fully
coordinated their tari¤s.) Specically, I suppose that symmetric rms rst agree on an
inter-rm discount (which they fund equally), and subsequently choose prices without
coordination. When valuations are additive, it is shown that such a scheme will usually
raise each rms prot, and, at least when valuations are independent, its operation will
also boost total welfare. However, when sellers o¤er substitute products, the negotiated
bundle discount acts to reduce the e¤ective substitutability between products, inducing
rms to raise prices. Thus, the scheme can induce collusion and harm consumers.
This paper is not the rst to investigate these issues. The incentive for an integrated
seller to o¤er a discount for the purchase of multiple items is discussed by Stigler (1963),
Adams and Yellen (1976), Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989),
among many others. The latter two papers showed that it is optimal to introduce a bundle
discount when the distribution of valuations is statistically independent and valuations are
additive, suggesting that a degree of joint pricing is optimal even for entirely unrelated
products. Except for Long, these papers assume that valuations are additive.6
Schmalensee (1982) and Lewbel (1985) study the incentive for a single-product monop-
olist unilaterally to o¤er a discount if its customers also purchased a competitively-supplied
product. Since the two products can be independent or substitutes in their analysis, their
argument is distinct from the idea that tying a monopoly product with a competitively-
supplied complementary product can be used as a metering device. Consider Schmalensees
argument in more detail. There are two items for sale to a population of consumers, and
item A is available at marginal cost due to competitive pressure, while item B is supplied
6Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) analyze an integrated rms incentive to engage in bundling when
products are either complements or substitutes. The analysis is carried out using a specic uniform
example, and a consumers valuation for the bundle is some constant proportion (greater or less than one,
depending on whether complements or substitutes are present) of the sum of her stand-alone valuations.
The focus of their analysis is mostly on whether pure bundling is superior to linear pricing. Dansby and
Conrad (1984) analyze a variant of the usual bundling model in which the act of bundling the two items can
a¤ect utility from the bundle (either upwards or downwards relative to the sum of stand-alone valuations).
In their model, a consumer can buy both items separately from the seller (in which case their valuation,
and the price they pay, is additive), or they can buy the bundle at the stipulated bundle price.
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by a monopolist. Valuations are additive, but are not independent in the statistical sense,
and the fact that a consumer is willing to buy item A is useful information for the mo-
nopolist. If there is negative correlation in the values for the two items, the fact that a
consumer buys item A is bad news for the monopolist, who then has an incentive to
set a lower price to its customers who also buy A. Lewbel performs a similar exercise but
allows the two items to be partial substitutes. In this case, the fact that a consumer buys
item A is also bad news for the monopolist, and provides a reason to o¤er a discount for
joint consumption.
Bundling arrangements between separate rms are analyzed by Gans and King (2006),
who investigate a model with two kinds of products (gasoline and food, say), and each
product is supplied by two di¤erentiated rms. When all four products are supplied by
separate rms which set their prices independently, there is no interaction between the two
kinds of product. However, two rms (one o¤ering each of the two kinds of product) can
enter into an alliance and agree to o¤er consumers a discount if they buy both products
from the alliance. (In their model, the joint pricing mechanism is similar to that used in
section 6 below: the rms decide on their bundle discount, which they agree to fund equally,
and then they set prices non-cooperatively.) Gans and King observe that when a bundle
discount is o¤ered for joint purchase of otherwise independent products, those products are
then converted into complements. In their model, in which consumer tastes are uniformly
distributed, a pair of rms does have an incentive to enter into such an alliance, but when
both pairs of rms do this, their equilibrium prots are unchanged from the situation when
all four rms set independent prices, although welfare and consumer surplus fall.7
A number of papers have investigated whether or not code sharing i.e., coordinated
pricing by separately-owned airlines for multi-ight itineraries is an e¢ cient practice.
Multi-ight itineraries are products made up of complementary components, and so the
ine¢ ciency of uncoordinated pricing by separate airlines is due to double marginalization.
An early theoretical contribution to this literature is Brueckner (2001), who provides a
model in which two airlines need to cooperate to prevent double-marginalisation on some
city-pair routes, but compete on other routes. In his model, if the two rms are permitted
to coordinate prices on all routes, the benets of price reductions on the non-competitive
7Brito and Vasconcelos (2010) modify this model so that rival suppliers of the same products are
vertically rather than horizontally di¤erentiated. They nd that when two pairs of rms form an alliance
all prices rise relative to the situation when all four products are marketed independently. This result
resembles the analysis in section 6 below, where an agreed bundle discount induces collusion in the market.
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routes tend to outweigh the harm done by allowing collusion on the competitive routes.
The current paper investigates when a seller wishes unilaterally to makes its price
contingent on whether a customer also purchases from another seller. Focussing on the
wholesale level, there is a growing literature on market share, or loyalty, contracts where
one manufacturer conditions its wholesale price on whether a retailer also purchases a
rival manufacturers product. For example, Calzolari and Denicolo (2009) propose a model
where consumers buy two products and each product is supplied by a single rm. Each
rm potentially o¤ers a nonlinear tari¤ which is a function of a consumers demand for its
own product and the consumers demand for the other rms product. They nd that the
use of these tari¤s can harm consumers compared to the situation in which rms base their
tari¤ only on their own supply. Their model di¤ers in two ways from the one presented
in this paper. First, in their model consumers have elastic (linear) demands, rather than
unit demands, for the two products. Thus, they must consider general nonlinear tari¤s,
while the rms in my model merely choose a pair of prices which makes the analysis more
tractable. Second, in my model consumers di¤er in richer way, and a consumer might
like product 1 but not product 2, and can vary in the degree of substitutability between
products. In Calzolari and Denicolo (2009), consumers di¤er by only a scalar parameter
(the demand intercept for both products), and so all consumers view the two products
when consumed alone as perfect substitutes.
Finally, Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Song (2010) discuss the case of pharmaceutical cock-
tails. Although the focus of their analysis is on situations in which rms set the same
price for a drug, regardless of whether it is used in isolation or as part of a cocktail, they
also consider situations where rms can set two di¤erent prices for the two kinds of uses.
They document how a rm selling treatments for HIV/AIDS set di¤erent prices for similar
chemicals depending on whether the drug was part of a cocktail or not. They estimate a
demand system for colorectal cancer drugs, where there are at least 12 major drug treat-
ments, 6 of which were cocktails which combine drugs from di¤erent rms. Although in
this particular market rms do not price drugs di¤erently depending whether the drug is
used in a cocktail, they estimate the impact when one rm engages in this form of price
discrimination. They nd that a rm will typically (but not always) reduce the price for
stand-alone use and raise the price for bundled use.
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2 Longs Analysis of Bundling
In a clever note, Long (1984) presents what could be termed an economic model of
bundling. Rather than following a diagrammatic exposition concentrating on the details
of joint distributions of two-dimensional consumer valuations, he uses standard tools from
demand theory to derive conditions under which o¤ering a bundling discount is optimal. In
this section, I recapitulate his analysis in its simplest, symmetric form. (Long also analyzes
the situation where products are asymmetric.)
Suppose there are two symmetric products supplied by an integrated monopolist, la-
belled 1 and 2, each of which has constant marginal cost c. A consumer wishes to buy
either zero or one unit of each product (and may wish to buy a unit of both products).
Due to the assumed symmetry of demand and cost, suppose the rm sets the same price
p for buying either product. Potentially, the rm o¤ers a discount   0 if the consumer
buys both products, so that the total price for buying both products is 2p  . Write the
proportion of all potential consumers who buy a single item as Xs and the proportion who
buy both items as Xb. The rms prot is therefore  = (p  c)Xs+(2p   2c)Xb, which
can be re-written as
 = N + (P   c)X ; (1)
where N  Xs + Xb is the proportion of consumers who buy something from the rm,
X  Xs+2Xb is the total number of units supplied, and P = p  is the incremental price
of a product given the consumer buys the other product. Expression (1) shows how the
bundling tari¤ can be viewed as a two-part tari¤ comprising a xed charge  and marginal
price P . Viewing the two demands N and X as functions of (; P ), given that there are no
income e¤ects standard demand theory indicates that cross-price e¤ects are symmetric, so
that NP  X (where subscripts denote partial derivatives).
The question whether it is protable to introduce a bundling discount is therefore
equivalent to whether it is protable to have a positive xed charge in this two-part tari¤.
Let P  be the monopolists most protable price when no bundle discount is o¤ered, i.e.,
P  maximizes (P  c)X(0; P ). Starting from this situation with linear pricing, consider the
impact on prot of introducing a small discount  > 0, keeping the marginal price xed at
P . From (1), the impact on prot is
@
@

=0
= N + (P    c)X = N + (P    c)NP = N   X
XP
NP
sign
=   @
@P
X
N
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(where every term on the right-hand side of the above is evaluated at  = 0). Here,
the third equality follows from the rst-order condition for the optimality of P . Thus,
introducing a bundle discount raises prots if average demand per consumer, X=N , falls
with price when  = 0. More exactly, if the rm o¤ers linear price p for either item (and no
bundle discount), write xs(p) and xb(p) respectively for the proportion of consumers who
buy a single item and who buy both items. Since when  = 0 we have
X
N
=
xs + 2xb
xs + xb
= 1 +
xb=xs
1 + xb=xs
;
the condition requires that the ratio xb=xs decreases with price, so that demand for a single
item is less elastic than demand for the bundle. We summarize this discussion as:
Result (Long, 1984): Suppose an integrated monopolist supplies two symmetric products.
The rm has an incentive to introduce a discount for buying the bundle whenever the
elasticity of demand for buying a single item is lower than the elasticity of demand for
buying both items, so that
 x
0
s(p)
xs(p)
<  x
0
b(p)
xb(p)
: (2)
In economic terms, condition (2) is intuitive: if the rm initially charges the same price
for buying a single item as for buying a second item, and if demand for the latter is more
elastic than demand for the former, then the rm would like to reduce its price for buying
a second item (and to increase its price for the rst item).
Consider the knife-edge case where a consumers valuation for the bundle is simply
the sum of her individual stand-alone valuations. That is, if the stand-alone valuation for
product i = 1; 2 is vi her valuation for the bundle is v1 + v2. With additive valuations, if
the rm o¤ers the linear price p for buying either item the consumers buying decision is
simple: she should buy product i whenever vi  p, as shown on Figure 1. Suppose that
the marginal c.d.f. for either valuation vi is F (vi). A useful way to capture the extent of
correlation in valuations is the function
	(p)  Prfv2  p j v1  pg : (3)
Then, as shown on the gure, we have
xs(p) = 2(1  F (p))(1 	(p)) ; xb(p) = (1  F (p))	(p) :
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It follows that (2) holds whenever
	(p) is strictly decreasing in p : (4)
Clearly, condition (4) holds if v1 and v2 are independently distributed, but it applies much
more widely.8 Indeed, the beauty of Longs approach is that condition (2) applies just as
well to situations in which valuations are not additive, as I discuss in more detail in the
following analysis.
-
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Figure 1: Pattern of demand with additive valuations
3 Bundling Revisited
Consider a market with two products, labeled 1 and 2, where there is a constant marginal
cost of supplying product i equal to ci. I consider situations where a monopolist supplies
both products and where the two products are supplied by separate rms. Each consumer
wishes to buy either zero or one unit of each product. A consumer is willing to pay vi
for product i = 1; 2 on its own, and to pay vb for the bundle of both products. Thus
a consumers preferences are entirely described by the vector (v1; v2; vb), and this vector
is distributed across the population of consumers according to some known distribution.
Unlike most of the bundling literature, I allow for non-additive preferences so that vb 6=
8An example which violates condition (4) is when v1 and v2 are perfectly positively correlated, so that
	  1.
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v1 + v2, and say that a consumer views the two products as partial substitutes whenever
vb  v1 + v2. Whenever there is free disposal (so that a consumer can discard one item
without cost), we require that vb  maxfv1; v2g for all consumers.
Consumers face three prices: p1 is the price for consuming product 1 on its own; p2 is
the price for product 2 on its own, and p1 + p2    is the price for consuming the bundle
of both products. Thus,  is the discount for buying both products (which is zero if there
is a linear price for each product, or negative if consumers are charged a premium for
joint consumption). A consumer chooses the option which leaves her with the highest net
surplus, i.e., she will buy both items whenever
vb   (p1 + p2   )  maxfv1   p1; v2   p2; 0g ;
she will buy product i = 1; 2 on its own whenever
vi   pi  maxfvb   (p1 + p2   ); vj   pj; 0g ;
and otherwise she will buy nothing.
As functions of the three tari¤ parameters (p1; p2; ), denote by Q1 the proportion of
potential consumers who buy only product 1, Q2 the proportion of consumers who buy
only product 2, and Qb the proportion of consumers who buy both products. It will also
be useful to discuss demand when no discount is o¤ered, so let qi(p1; p2)  Qi(p1; p2; 0)
and qb(p1; p2)  Qb(p1; p2; 0) be the corresponding demand functions when  = 0. Indeed,
we will see that a rms incentive to introduce a bundle discount is determined entirely by
the properties of the no-discountdemand functions qi and qb. This is important insofar
as these demand functions are more likely to be identied from market data than the more
hypothetical demands Qi and Qb.9
Finally, to avoid tedious caveats involving corner solutions in the following analysis,
suppose that over the relevant range of linear prices there is some two-item demand, so
that qb > 0.
9The model of consumer preferences presented here is related to the small empirical literature which
estimates discrete consumer choice when multiple goods are chosen simultaneously. For instance, see
Gentzkow (2007) who estimates the degree of complementarity between print and online newspapers. In
his illustrative model in section 1.A, he supposes that the value of the bundle is the sum of the values of
the two individual products plus a constant term (which could be positive or negative), which is similar
to Example 1 discussed later in this paper.
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Properties of consumer demand: One property which is almost immediate is that
total demand for a product is an increasing function of the bundle discount. To see this,
observe that a consumer buys product 1, say, if and only if
maxfvb   (p1 + p2   ); v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g :
(The left-hand side above is the consumers maximum surplus if she buys product 1
either in the bundle or on its own while the right-hand side is the consumers maximum
surplus if she does not buy product 1.) Clearly, the set of such consumers is increasing
(in the set-theoretic sense) in , and hence the measure of such consumers is as well. For
convenience, we state this formally:
Lemma 1: Total demand for product i, Qi +Qb, increases with the bundle discount .
In the case of separate supply, this result implies that when one rm introduces an inter-
rm bundle discount, the prots of its rival will rise. Similar arguments show that each of
the demands Qi, Qb and Qi +Qb decrease with the price pi.
When linear prices are used, products are said to be gross substitutes if total demand for
product i, qi + qb, increases with the other products linear price pj. As one would expect,
if all consumers view products as partial substitutes, products are then gross substitutes:
Lemma 2: Suppose that vb  v1+v2 for all consumers. Then when linear prices are used,
demand for product i, qi + qb, weakly increases with pj.
(All omitted proofs are contained in the appendix.)
Importantly, when a bundle discount is o¤ered, this result can be reversed. That is
to say, if products are partial substitutes then when  > 0 the demand for a product can
decrease with the stand-alone price of the other product. The observation that a bundle
discount can mitigate or overturn the innate substitutability of products is a recurring
theme in the following analysis.
Regardless of whether the underlying products are complements or substitutes, the
three discrete purchasing options (buy product 1 only, buy product 2 only, or buy both
12
products) are necessarily substitutes, in the sense that cross-price e¤ects are non-negative:
@Qi
@
 0 ; @Qj
@pi
+
@Qj
@
 0 ; @Qb
@pi
+
@Qb
@
 0 : (5)
(Concerning the second and third inequalities here, note that if price pi and discount 
rise by the same amount, the prices for the bundle or product j on its own are unchanged,
but the stand-alone price for item i rises.) We also necessarily have Slutsky symmetry of
cross-price e¤ects, so that
@Q2
@p1
+
@Q2
@
 @Q1
@p2
+
@Q1
@
;
@Qb
@pi
+
@Qb
@
  @Qi
@
: (6)
Note that setting  = 0 in the right-hand expression in (6) implies the following result:
Lemma 3: The impact of a small bundle discount on the total demand for product i is
equal to the impact of a corresponding price cut on the demand for the bundle, i.e.,
@(Qi +Qb)
@

=0
=  @qb
@pi
: (7)
This result will play a key role in the following analysis of the protability of introducing
a bundle discount.
Integrated supply: Suppose rst that an integrated monopolist supplies both products.
The rms prot with the bundling tari¤ (p1; p2; ) is
 = (p1   c1)(Q1 +Qb) + (p2   c2)(Q2 +Qb)  Qb : (8)
Given that the three purchase options are substitutes, the most protable bundling tari¤
will involve above-cost pricing for each option, so that
pi  ci ; p1 + p2     c1 + c2 :
Consider the rms incentive to o¤er a bundling discount. Starting from any pair of
linear prices (p1; p2), by di¤erentiating (8) we see that the impact on prot of introducing
a small discount  > 0 is
@
@

=0
=

(p1   c1) @
@
(Q1 +Qb) + (p2   c2) @
@
(Q2 +Qb) Qb

=0
=  (p1   c1)@qb
@p1
  (p2   c2)@qb
@p2
  qb ; (9)
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where the second equality follows from (7). Let (p1; p

2) be the most protable linear prices.
Therefore,
(p1; p

2) maximizes (p1   c1)(q1 + qb) + (p1   c2)(q2 + qb) ;
which has rst-order condition for pi given by
qi + qb + (p

1   c1)
@
@pi
(q1 + qb) + (p

2   c2)
@
@pi
(q2 + qb) = 0 : (10)
If the products are gross substitutes, both price-cost margins are positive, and in particular
(p2 c2) @@p1 (q2+qb)  0 and (p1 c1) @@p2 (q1+qb)  0. The rst-order condition (10) therefore
implies that
pi   ci 
qi + qb
 @(qi + qb)=@pi for i = 1; 2 : (11)
Substituting this pair of inequalities into (9) shows that o¤ering a bundle discount is
protable whenever condition (12) holds, as summarized in this result:
Proposition 1: Suppose that products are gross substitutes and that
q1 + qb
qb
@qb=@p1
@(q1 + qb)=@p1
+
q2 + qb
qb
@qb=@p2
@(q2 + qb)=@p2
> 1 : (12)
Then the integrated monopolist has an incentive to o¤er a discount when a customer buys
both products.
Condition (12) is satised when demand for the bundle is not too muchless elastic
than the overall demand for each product. A simple su¢ cient condition for (12) to hold
is that each term on the left-hand side is greater than a half, so that a price rise which
causes total demand for a particular product to fall by 10% causes demand for the bundle
to fall by more than 5%.
Separate sellers: Next, suppose that each product is supplied by a separate seller, and
the sellers set their tari¤s simultaneously. When rms o¤er linear prices i.e., prices which
do not depend on whether the consumer also purchases the other product rm i chooses
its price pi , given its rivals price, to maximize (pi   ci)(qi + qb). In some circumstances, a
rm can condition its price on whether a consumer also buys the rival rms product. For
instance, a museum could ask a visitor to show her entry ticket to the other museum to
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claim a discount. The next result describes when a rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er
a discount when a customer buys the other rms product.
Proposition 2: Suppose that demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for rm
is stand-alone product, i.e., that
  1
qb
@qb
@pi
>   1
qi
@qi
@pi
: (13)
Starting from the situation where both rms set the equilibrium linear prices p1 and p

2, rm
i has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy product j: If expression
(13) is reversed, rm i would like, if feasible, to charge its customers a premium if they
also buy product j.
Thus, discounts for joint purchase can arise even when products are supplied by separate
rms and when a rm chooses, and funds, the discount unilaterally. The reason for this is
straightforward: since demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for its stand-
alone product, a rm wants to o¤er a lower price to those consumers who also buy the
other product. As Lemma 1 shows, the introduction of this discount will also benet the
rival rm.
At least for given stand-alone prices (p1; p2), condition (13) is stronger than condition
(12).10 Therefore, whenever a separate seller has an incentive to bundle, we expect that
an integrated rm does also (but not necessarily vice versa). Intuitively, if it is protable
for a separate seller to introduce its own bundle discount even without taking into account
the positive externality this discount brings to the other seller, it will also be protable for
an integrated rm to introduce a discount.
If rm i = 1; 2 o¤ers the price pi when a consumer only buys its product and the price
pi i when she also buys the rivals product, a consumer who buys both products pays the
price p1 + p2   1   2. The issue then arises as to how the combined discount  = 1 + 2
is implemented. For instance, in some cases a consumer must buy the two items in order,
10Formally, if condition (13) holds for rm i, then demand for the bundle is more elastic than total
demand for that rms product, and so
qi + qb
qb
@qb=@pi
@(qi + qb)=@pi
> 1 :
Therefore, condition (12) is satised.
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and both rms cannot simultaneously require proof of purchase from the other seller when
they o¤er their discount.11
However, there are at least two natural ways to implement such an inter-rm bundling
scheme. First, the bundle discount could be implemented via an electronic sales platform
which allows consumers to buy products from several sellers simultaneously. The sellers
choose their prices contingent on which other products (if any) a consumers buys, a website
displays the total prices for the various combinations, and rms receive directly their
stipulated revenue from the chosen combination. With such a mechanism there is no need
for rms to coordinate their tari¤s. Second, there may be product aggregatorspresent
in the market who put together their own packages from separate rms and retail them
to nal consumers. (See footnote 1 for an example of this practice.) In the two-product
case discussed in this paper, aggregators bundle the two products and each rm chooses a
wholesale price for its product contingent on being part of this package. If the aggregator
market is competitive, the price of the bundle will simply be the sum of the two wholesale
prices. Again, there is no need for rms to coordinate their prices.
A major di¤erence between these inter-rm bundling discounts and the discount o¤ered
by an integrated supplier is that with separate sellers the bundle discount is chosen non-
cooperatively. A bundle is, by denition, made up of two complementarycomponents,
namely, rm 1s product and rm 2s product, and the total price for the bundle, p1+p2 
1   2, is the sum of each rms component price pi   i. When one rm considers the
size of its own discount i, it ignores the benet this discount confers on its rival. Thus,
as usual with separate supply of complementary components, double marginalization will
result and the overall discount  = 1 + 2 will be too small (for given stand-alone prices).
Without specifying consumer tastes in more detail, it is hard to derive further results. In
11However, even if proof of purchase could be provided, this is not necessarily an ideal way to implement
the inter-rm bundle discount. In the Aspen case mentioned in the introduction, a small ski-lift operator
(with only one mountain) wished to participate in the bundled ticket o¤ered by the larger rm (which
operated on three mountains). The large operator refused to do this on terms acceptable to the small
operator, and so the latter attempted to put together its own four-mountain ticket. It tried to purchase
the rivals three-mountain ticket (at full price) and add its own mountain to that. However, the larger
operator refused to sell its ticket for that purpose. Presumably, the small operator could have announced
to potential customers that if they show it their three-mountain ticket, the small rm will give them its
own mountain ticket, thus making up a full four-mountain ticket. But such a scheme has disadvantages
for the small rm: customers are instructed to visit the large rival rst, and there is a danger that, due to
transactions costs, many such customers would not bother coming back to the small rm. For whatever
reason, though, the small rm did not choose to follow this strategy. See Easterbrook (1986, page 972) for
more details.
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the next sections which cover respectively the cases of integrated and separate supply we
specialise the framework in various ways to obtain further insight.
4 Integrated Supply
For maximum transparency of the analysis, suppose now that the two products are sym-
metric, so that c1 = c2 = c and the same density of consumers have taste vector (v1; v2; vb)
as have the permuted taste vector (v2; v1; vb). As in section 2, let xs(p) denote the propor-
tion of consumers who buy any single item when the linear price for either item is p and let
xb(p) denote the proportion of consumers who buy both items when the linear price is p.
Then section 2 shows that an integrated monopolist wishes to introduce a bundle discount
whenever (2) holds. As before, let F () denote the marginal c.d.f. for either stand-alone
valuation vi, and in the following assume that F has an increasing hazard rate, so that
f(v)
1  F (v) strictly increases with v : (14)
Suppose the products are partial substitutes, so that vb  v1 + v2 for all consumers.
For a type-(v1; v2; vb) consumer, dene
V1  maxfv1; v2g ; V2  vb   V1 ; (15)
so that V1 is her maximum utility if she buys only one item and V2 is her incremental
utility from buying the second item. The assumption that products are substitutes implies
V2  minfv1; v2g  V1 ;
so that the support of (V1; V2) lies under the 450 line, as shown on Figure 2. Note that
vb = V1 + V2, so that valuations are additive after the change of variables (15). With
a linear price p for either item, a type-(V1; V2) consumer will buy both items whenever
V2  p, and will buy only one item whenever V2 < p  V1, as depicted on the gure. As in
expression (3), dene
(p)  PrfV2  p j V1  pg : (16)
If we write G(P )  PrfV1  Pg for the marginal c.d.f. for V1, by examining Figure 2, we
see that12
xs(p) = (1 G(p))(1  (p)) ; xb(p) = (1 G(p))(p) : (17)
12In terms of the c.d.f. F () and function 	() in (3), we have 1 G(p) = (1  F (p))(2 	(p)):
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It follows immediately that when  is decreasing condition (2) holds, and we deduce the
following generalization of Longs original condition (4) to the case where products are
partial substitutes:
Proposition 3: Suppose products are substitutes and  in (16) is strictly decreasing.
Then an integrated monopolist has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount.
Note that Proposition 3 applies equally to an alternative framework where the monop-
olist supplies a single product, and where consumers wish to buy zero, one or two units of
this product. Here, the parameter V1 represents a consumers value for consuming one unit
of the good, and V2 is her incremental value for a second unit (so her total value for two
units is V1 + V2). Then Proposition 3 applies in this framework, so that when (16) holds
in the population of consumers, the single-product rm will wish to o¤er a tari¤ which
involves a quantity discount.13 (However, this alternative interpretation of the model is
not as natural in the separate sellers context, since we would have to assume that for some
reason each supplier could only sell a single unit of the product to any consumer.)
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Figure 2: Pattern of demand with substitutes
A natural question is whether products being partial substitutes makes it more or
less likely that the integrated rm wishes to introduce a bundle discount, relative to the
13See Maskin and Riley (1984) for an early contribution to the theory of quantity discounts, where in
contrast to the current paper consumers di¤er by only a scalar parameter.
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corresponding situation with additive valuations. To gain insight into this issue, consider a
market where the stand-alone valuations, v1 and v2, have a given (symmetric) distribution.
In scenario (i), each consumers valuation for the bundle is additive, so that vb  v1 + v2.
Then we know from section 2 that the rm has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount
whenever xb=xs is decreasing in the linear price p, which is equivalent to the condition that
xb=N decreases with p. (Recall that N = xs + xb is the fraction of consumers who buy
something from the rm.) Now consider an alternative situation (ii) which is the same as
(i) except that vb  v1+ v2. Write the fraction of consumers who buy both items at linear
price p with these preferences as x^b(p). Then, as in (i), it is protable to o¤er a bundle
discount whenever x^b=N decreases with p. (Note that N is exactly the same function in
the two scenarios, and given by (1   F )(2   	) as shown on Figure 1.) Thus, if x^b=xb
(weakly) decreases with price, then if bundling is protable under scenario (i) it is sure to
be protable under scenario (ii) as well. That is to say, if bundle demand in the case of
substitutes is no less elastic than it would be with additive valuations, then (3) decreasing
implies that (16) is also decreasing. We summarize this formally as:
Corollary 1: All else equal, if bundle demand when products are partial substitutes is
more elastic than bundle demand with additive valuations, then if it is protable to o¤er a
bundle discount with additive valuations it is also protable to o¤er a bundle discount with
substitute products.
It is plausible, though not inevitable, that demand x^b is no less elastic than demand xb.
Since V2  minfv1; v2g, it follows that x^b  xb. Thus, for x^b to be no less elastic we require
that the slope  x^0b not be too muchsmaller than  x0b.14
In this rest of this section, I describe three special cases of this analysis. (I revisit the
same examples when presenting the analysis for separate supply.)
14An example where the substitutability of products makes the rm less likely to engage in bundling is
as follows. Suppose that vb = v1 + v2 if minfv1; v2g  k and vb = maxfv1; v2g otherwise, where k is some
constant. Thus, preferences are additive when both stand-alone valuations are high, while if one valuation
does not meet the threshold the incremental value for the second item is zero. With these preferences,
whenever the linear price satises p < k those consumers with minfv1; v2g  k will buy both items, and
this set does not depend on the price. Therefore, bundle demand xb is completely inelastic for p < k,
while in the corresponding example without substitution (i.e., setting k = 0), bundle demand is elastic.
Whenever k is large enough (so that the equilibrium linear price is below k), one can check that starting
from the most protable linear price p, the rm makes strictly less prot if it o¤ers a small bundle discount.
19
Example 1: Constant disutility of joint consumption.
Consider the situation in which for all consumers
vb = v1 + v2   z (18)
for some constant z  0. Here, to ensure free disposal we need to assume that the minimum
possible realization of vi is greater than z. Then with a linear price pi for buying product
i, the pattern of demand is as shown on Figure 3.15 The next result provides a su¢ cient
condition for bundling to be protable in this setting.
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Figure 3: Pattern of demand with constant disutility of joint purchase
Proposition 4: Suppose that bundle valuations are given by (18). Then an integrated
monopolist has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when condition (4) holds:
To illustrate, suppose that (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on the unit square [1; 2]2,
that z = 1
4
and that c = 1.16 Then an integrated monopolist which uses linear prices
15Note that the pattern of demand with linear pricing and a disutility of joint consumption z > 0 is the
same as that corresponding to additive valuations and a tari¤ premium for buying both items. (The latter
is illustrated in Long, 1984, Figure 8.) Thus, just as a bundle discount can convert independent products
into complements, a bundle premium converts independent products into substitutes.
16This example gives rise to a linear demand system when linear prices are used, and when prices are
such that there is some two-item demand and some consumers who buy nothing, Figure 3 shows that the
total demand for product i is equal to k   pi + 14pj for a constant k.
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will choose price p  1:521, generating prot of around 0:407. At this price, around 73%
of potential consumers buy something, although only 5% buy both products. The most
protable bundling tari¤ can be shown to be
p  1:594 ;   0:380 ; (19)
which generates prot of about 0:449, and about 66% of potential consumers buy something
but now 28% buy both items. In particular, note that the bundle discount is large enough to
outweigh the innate substitutability of the products (i.e.,  > z). Faced with this bundling
tari¤ consumers now view the two products as complements rather than substitutes, and
the pattern of demand looks like Figure 5 below rather than Figure 3. Nevertheless, the
discount in (19) is smaller than in the corresponding example with additive valuations (i.e.,
when z = 0).17
Example 2: Time-constrained consumers.
-
6
6
-
(1  F )	
(1  F )(1 	)
(1  F )(1 	)
0 p
p
v1
v2
buy only product 1
buy both products
buy only
product 2
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
-
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1  F )(1  1
2
	)
(1  F )(1  1
2
	)
0 p
p
v1
v2
buy only product 1
buy only
product 2
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
Figure 4A: Additive valuations Figure 4B: Time-constrained consumers
A natural reason why products might be substitutes is that some buyers are only able
to consume a restricted set of products, e.g., due to time constraints.18 For instance, a
17When c = 1, (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [1; 2]2 and vb  v1+ v2, one can check that p = 53 and
 =
p
2
3  0:47:
18In the context of competitive intra-rm bundling, Thanassoulis (2007) also analyzes the situation
where an exogenous fraction of consumers wish to buy a single product.
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tourist may have the time only to visit a single museum in a city. To that end, suppose that
an exogenous fraction  of consumers have valuation vi for stand-alone product i = 1; 2
and valuation vb = v1 + v2 for the bundle, while the remaining consumers can only buy
a single item (and have valuation vi if they buy item i). For simplicity, suppose that the
distribution for (v1; v2) is the same for the two groups of consumers. Let the marginal c.d.f.
for each vi be F (v), and let 	() be as dened in (3). (See Figure 4 for an illustration.)
The central feature of this scenario is that the time-constrained consumers have zero
incremental value for the second item (i.e., V2 = 0). It is then straightforward to show that
(p) = 
	(p)
2 	(p) ;
so that  is decreasing if and only if 	 is decreasing. Proposition 3 therefore has the
corollary:
Proposition 5: When some consumers are time-constrained, an integrated rm has an
incentive to o¤er a bundle discount if and only if (4) holds, i.e., under the same condition
as when consumers have additive preferences.
Example 3: Stand-alone values (v1; v2) are uniformly distributed on the unit square
[0; 1]2, and given (v1; v2) the bundle value vb is uniformly distributed on the interval
[maxfv1; v2g; v1 + v2]. Production is costless.
(Recall that with free disposal we require that vb be at leastmaxfv1; v2g, and vb  v1+v2
if products are substitutes.) In contrast to the previous examples, this example has a
full three-dimensional distribution for consumer valuations. Moreover, it is worthwhile
studying this example since the method used here can be adapted to solve any specic
(twoproduct) bundling problem.
The detailed calculations for this example are presented in the appendix. One can show
that the optimal linear price is approximately p  0:540, which yields industry prot
of 0.406. Note that about 70% of potential consumers buy something given this price,
although only 4% of consumers buy both items. One can show that  is strictly decreasing
in this example, and so Proposition 3 implies that the rm will wish to o¤er a bundle
discount. Indeed, the optimal bundling tari¤ is
p  0:648 ;   0:588 (20)
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which yields prot 0.463. Notice that, compared to the corresponding example with ad-
ditive values, the bundle discount is deeper.19 With this bundling tari¤, where the incre-
mental price for the second item is rather small, about 51% of potential consumers now
buy both items and only 15% of consumers buy a single item.
Summary: This section focussed on the case when an integrated rm supplies products
which are partial substitutes. A general condition was derived (Proposition 3) which
governs when the rm wishes to o¤er a bundle discount, and a number of special cases
were solved. We saw in examples that the bundle discount could be higher or lower than
the corresponding case with additive utility. We saw that in most cases the presence of
substitutability made it more likely that the rm will wish to o¤er a discount, relative to
the corresponding situation with additive preferences. For instance, in the case of time-
constrained consumers, the condition governing when bundling is used was exactly the same
as when values were additive, and when there was a xed disutility of joint consumption,
bundling was protable in more cases than the additive case.
In broad terms, when products are substitutes there is an extra motive to o¤er a bundle
discount, relative to the additive case, which is to try to serve customers with a second
item even though the incremental utility of the second item is lowered by the purchase of
the rst item. Intuitively, once a customer has purchased one item, this is bad news for
her willingness-to-pay for the other item, and this often gives the rm a motive to reduce
price for the second item. With additive preferences, the only motive in this model to use a
bundle discount is to extract information rent from consumers, and this motive vanishes if
the rm knows consumer preferences. With sub-additive preferences, the rm may wish to
o¤er a bundling tari¤ even when it knows the customers tastes.20 While with integrated
supply sub-additive preferences merely give an additional reason to bundle, with separate
sellers such preferences will often be the sole reason to o¤er a bundle discount, as I discuss
in more detail in the next section.
19When c = 0, (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]2 and vb  v1+ v2, one can check that p = 23 and
 =
p
2
3  0:47:
20For instance, suppose the consumer has known sub-additive valuations v1 = v2 = 3 and vb = 4. If
production is costless, then with linear pricing the most protable strategy for the rm is to sell just one
item for price p = 3. Clearly, with a bundling tari¤ the rm can extract the rst-best prot of 4.
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5 Separate Sellers
In this section I turn to the situation where the two products are supplied by separate
sellers. I rst consider the situation where the sellers do not compete, in the sense that
consumer valuations are additive, and then go on to consider the three special cases with
substitute products presented earlier in the context of integrated supply in section 4.
Additive valuations: Suppose that vb = v1+v2 for all consumers. With separate sellers,
there is no particular benet in assuming that the products are symmetric. Let Fi(vi) and
fi(vi) be respectively the marginal c.d.f. and the marginal density for vi, and dene
Hi(pi j vj) = Prfvi  pi j vjg
to be the conditional c.d.f. for value vi when the other value is vj. The next result provides
a su¢ cient condition for a rm to o¤er a discount when its customers buy the other rms
product:
Proposition 6: Suppose that valuations are additive. Starting from the situation where
rms set equilibrium linear prices, rm i has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those
consumers who buy the other product whenever Hj(pj j vi) strictly increases with vi (where
pj is rm js equilibrium linear price).
Thus, whenever the valuations are negatively correlated, in the strong sense thatHj(pj j
vi) strictly decreases with vi, a rm has an incentive to o¤er a discounted price for joint
purchase. It is intuitive that negative correlation is associated with the incentive to engage
in inter-rm bundling when valuations are additive. If rm i knows that a potential
consumer has purchased rm js product, i.e., the consumer has a relatively high value for
item j, then negative correlation implies that this is bad news for the consumers likely
value for is product, which will usually induce the rm to lower its price to this consumer.
We next consider the three examples with non-additive valuations discussed in the
previous section.
Example 1. Here, the pattern of consumer demand is as illustrated in Figure 3. For
simplicity, I focus on the situation where v1 and v2 are identically and independently
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distributed. (From Proposition 6, we already know that negative correlation will tend to
give an incentive to o¤er a unilateral bundle discount.) The next result shows that a rm
typically does have a unilateral incentive to o¤er a bundle discount.
Proposition 7: Suppose that v1 and v2 are identically and independently distributed with
c.d.f. satisfying (14) and that the bundle valuations satisfy (18). When the two products
are supplied by separate sellers, each seller has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those
consumers who buy the rival product.
It is economically intuitive that products being substitutes of the form (18) will give
an incentive to a rm to o¤er a discount when its customers purchase the rival product.
If the potential customer purchases the other product, this is bad news for the rm as the
customers incremental value for its product has been shifted downwards by z, and this
will give an incentive to o¤er the customer a lower price.
Consider the same specic example as presented in section 4 (that is, (v1; v2) uniform
on [1; 2]2, z = 1
4
and c = 1) applied to the case with separate sellers. The equilibrium linear
price is p  1:446 and industry prot is about 0.399. Around 9% of consumers buy both
items with this linear price, and 80% of all consumers buy something. The equilibrium
inter-rm bundling tari¤ is
p1 = p2 = 1:476 ; 1 = 2 = 0:05 :
Thus, the discount  = 1 + 2 when a consumer buys the second product is about 7% of
the stand-alone price. This bundle discount is approximately one quarter the size of the
discount with integrated supply (see expression (19) above), reecting the discussion in
section 3 that separate rms will unilaterally choose too small a discount. Now, around
14% of consumers buy both items, and industry prot rises to 0.421. Intuitively, when
rms o¤er a bundle discount, this reduces the e¤ective degree of substitution between
products, which in turn relaxes competition between rms. Note that the equilibrium
linear price lies between the two discriminatory prices when rms engage in this form of
price discrimination.21
21The same feature is seen in Examples 2 and 3 which follow. This is to be expected in the light of the
analysis in Corts (1998), who shows that when the two rms wish to set their lower price to the same group
of customers (the weakmarket, which in this example is the set of customer who buy both products),
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Example 2. Consider next the situation with time-constrained consumers when separate
sellers supply the products:
Proposition 8: Suppose that v1 and v2 are identically and independently distributed with
c.d.f. satisfying (14) and that some consumers are time-constrained. When the two prod-
ucts are supplied by separate sellers, a seller has no incentive to o¤er a discount to those
consumers who buy the rival product. (They would, if feasible, like to charge their customers
a higher price when a customer buys the rival product.)
In this setting, the observation that a consumer wishes to buy both items implies she
belongs to the non-competitive group of consumers, and a rm would like to exploit
its monopoly position over those consumers if feasible.22 Of course, in many situations, a
consumer can hide her purchase from a rival rm, in which case a rm cannot feasibly levy
a premium when a customer buys another suppliers product.
Example 3. Following the approach discussed in the appendix, one can show that when
separate rms supply the two products the equilibrium linear price in this example is
p  0:426 which yields industry prot of 0.388. Here, about 82% of potential consumers buy
something at this price, and 9% of consumers buy both products. When rm i unilaterally
o¤ers a discount i to its customers when they also purchase the rival product, so that the
total bundle discount is  = 1 + 2, then the symmetric equilibrium bundling tari¤ is
p  0:440 ;  = 0:081 (21)
and a rm o¤ers about a 10% discount when a customer also buys the rival product. Here,
equilibrium prot rises to 0.404, about 81% of consumers buy something and 14% now buy
the bundle. Note that the price for the bundle with separate sellers in (21) is greater than
the cost of the bundle with integrated supply in (20), which reects the earlier observation
then the equilibrium non-discriminatory price lies between the two discriminatory prices. However, we
cannot apply Cortsresult directly, since his argument relies on there being no cross-price e¤ects across
the two consumer groups, which is not the case in the current setting.
22Consider the specic example where c = 0, (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]2 and half of
consumers can only buy a single product ( = 12 ). Then one can check that when rms use linear pricing,
the equilibrium price is p  0:464, whereas when they engage in price discrimination the stand-alone price
falls to p  0:454 and a rms price when its customer buys the other product rises to about 0:477.
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that an integrated rm has an incentive to o¤er a deeper discount than separate sellers.
Summary: This section considered a rms incentive to o¤er a discount when a customer
also buys the rival product. Two broad forces may provide such an incentive. First, if a
consumers value for one product is negatively correlated with the other, the information
that a consumer has purchased the rival product (i.e., its value for the rival product is
relative high) is bad news for a rm, and typically induces it to lower its price to that
customer. Second, if purchasing the rival product causes a consumers incremental value
for the rms product to fall, due to substitution, then the rm may wish to reduce its
price to these customers (Example 1). However, Example 2 showed that an alternative
form of substitution makes a rm wish to set a higher price when its customers buy the
rival product. Thus, the precise form in which products are substitutes is important for a
rms incentive to o¤er inter-rm bundling discounts.
It is plausible that the framework studied here, where customers are nal consumers,
could sometimes be extended to situations where rival manufacturers supply products to a
retailer, which then supplies one or both products to nal consumers. (Indeed, traditional
retailers are the most prevalent of the product aggregators discussed in the introduc-
tion.) If the manufacturers supply products which are partial substitutes, this analysis
suggests that one manufacturer could have an incentive to charge a lower price if the re-
tailer also chooses to supply the rival product. This is the opposite pricing pattern to the
loyalty pricingschemes which often worry antitrust authorities. On the other hand, if
the situation is more like the time-constrained consumer case i.e., some retailers can only
stock one of the two products, perhaps because of shelf or refrigeration constraints then
a supplier has an incentive to charge the retailer less if the retailer does not stock the rival
product, which is the more conventional prediction.
6 Partial Coordination Between Sellers
The analysis to this point has considered the two extreme cases where (a) there is no tari¤
coordination between separate sellers, and (b) where there is complete tari¤ coordination
between sellers. (The integrated-rm analysis in section 4 describes the outcome when two
sellers coordinate their pricing to maximize industry prot.). The problem with complete
coordination is that any competition between rivals is eliminated. As discussed in section
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3, though, the welfare problem with a policy of permitting no coordination between sellers
is that the resulting bundle discount may be ine¢ ciently small (or non-existent). It would
be desirable, if feasible, to obtain the e¢ ciency gains which may accrue to bundling without
permitting the rms to collude over their regular prices.23 One way this might be achieved
is if rms rst negotiate an inter-rm bundle discount and then compete in the usual way
by choosing their stand-alone prices independently.
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Figure 5: Pattern of demand with additive values and bundling discount  > 0
To consider this situation in more detail, suppose that two symmetric rms supply
two products. The rms interact in two stages in a similar manner to the procedure in
the four-rm analysis of Gans and King (2006). First, the two rms agree on a bundle
discount,  say, which they agree to fund equally. That is to say, if rm i = 1; 2 chooses
stand-alone price pi, the consumer pays this price if she buys only that rms product
(and the rm receives that revenue), but if she buys both products she pays p1 + p2   
and rm i receives revenue pi  12. After  is chosen, rms choose their stand-alone prices
unilaterally. Far-sighted rms will choose  after taking into account how this discount will
a¤ect their interaction in the second stage. Since separate rms tend to set lower prices
when products are more substitutable, and since a bundle discount mitigates or overturns
a consumers view of the products as substitutes, it will usually be the case that an agreed
23In the context of code-sharing by airlines, ideally one would like to allow airlines to coordinate their
pricing when they jointly o¤er multi-ight itineraries so as to avoid double marginalization, but not when
they compete along similar routes.
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bundle discount  will induce rms to set higher stand-alone prices. To the extent this is
so, a joint-pricing scheme of this form could act as an instrument of collusion.24
Consider rst the case in which valuations are additive. Then for an agreed inter-rm
discount , the pattern of demand for the two rms is as illustrated in Figure 5. The
following result shows that this joint pricing scheme leads to higher industry prot, and
describes when the scheme also increases total welfare.
Proposition 9: Suppose that products are symmetric and valuations are additive. The
marginal c.d.f. for either value vi satises (14). For given  > 0 consider the joint pricing
scheme in which if rm i = 1; 2 sets the stand-alone price pi then the price for buying
both products is p1 + p2    and rm i receives revenue pi   12 when a bundle is sold. If
condition (4) holds, for su¢ ciently small  > 0 this inter-rm bundling scheme increases
each rms prot, relative to the situation where the products are marketed independently.
In addition, if the function H(p; v)  Prfv2  p j v1 = vg weakly increases with v, the
scheme increases total welfare for small .
This result suggests that joint bundling schemes should, in theory, be both protable
and welfare-enhancing for many groups of suppliers, even if they supply seemingly unrelated
products. Proposition 9 could be seen as the separate selleranalogue of the result for
integrated monopoly derived by Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989),
who showed that when valuations were additive and condition (4) was satised it was
protable for a monopolist to introduce a bundle discount.
The reason that a small agreed inter-rm discount will boost prot is intuitive. A
small  > 0 will have some e¤ect on each rms choice of stand-alone price, but this has
no rst-order impact on a rms prot. (A small change in the rms own price does not
signicantly a¤ect its prot, since the original price was at the optimal level. And with
additive valuations a small change in the other rms price does not a¤ect the rms prot
24The mechanism discussed in this section, whereby rms initially choose a bundle discount and then
independently choose their regular prices, is just one of many possible joint pricing schemes rms could
organize. Another kind of mechanism involves rms jointly choosing the price for the bundle, and then
setting their regular prices independently. In any such scheme, rms need to agree on a rule for how to
allocate the revenue from bundle sales. Possibilities include sharing the revenue based on usageof the
various products (as was done by the two Aspen ski-lift operators before their joint pricing scheme was
abandoned), according to a xed share regardless of rmsprices or consumer demands, or in proportion
to the rmsregular prices. See Ginsburgh and Zang (2004) and Armstrong (2010) for further discussions
of the merits and drawbacks of these various options.
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when the bundle discount is zero.) The rst-order impact of  on industry prot is that, for
a xed stand-alone price p, the introduction of a bundle discount boosts prot whenever
expression (4) is satised. The impact on total welfare is more complex, as the impact
of the discount on equilibrium prices needs to be considered. A bundle discount tends
to induce rms to raise their stand-alone prices. A bundle discount converts independent
products into complements, and this typically induces separate rms to set higher prices.
However, when values are independently distributed or negatively correlated (in the sense
that H(p; v) increases with v), the impact of the price rise is not large enough to outweigh
the e¢ ciency benets of the bundle discount, and total welfare rises when the scheme is
used.
To illustrate, consider the example where (v1; v2) is uniformly distributed on the unit
square [0; 1]2 and c = 0. Using Figure 5, one can show that each rms equilibrium stand-
alone price as a function of the agreed discount is
p() =
3 + 22 + 2
3 + 4
;
which is indeed increasing in . For small , Proposition 9 shows that this scheme benets
the rms and e¢ ciency.25 However, in this example the scheme reduces aggregate consumer
surplus.26
While the operation of this joint pricing scheme appears to be relatively benign when
values are additive, this can easily be reversed when rms o¤er substitutable products.
Consumers benet, and total welfare rises, when rms are forced to set low prices due
to products being substitutes. However, an agreed inter-rm discount can reduce the
e¤ective substitutability of products, and thus relax competition between suppliers. While
this e¤ect can be demonstrated more generally, for maximum clarity consider the following
simple example:
Example 4: There are two prot-maximizing museums in a city, and the marginal cost
of a museum visit is zero. All tourists have identical tastes, and the two museums are
25One can check that the most protable choice of  for the rms is   0:38, with corresponding stand-
alone price p  0:67. Thus, compared to the tari¤chosen by an integrated monopolist (where p = 23 and  
0:47), the stand-alone price is essentially unchanged but the chosen discount is reduced. In particular, even
when rms coordinate on their bundle discount let alone when this is chosen unilaterally as emphasized
earlier in the paper this discount is smaller than that which would be chosen by a monopolist.
26When  = 0, we have p0(0) = 38 . Therefore, when  is small that half of the consumer population
who only buy one item experience a price rise of 38, while that quarter of consumers who buy both items
experience a net price fall of 14. Thus, the net impact on consumers is a loss of
1
8.
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homogenous in the sense that if a tourist visits just one museum, she does not mind which
one it is. A tourist values visiting any single museum at V1 and gains incremental utility
V2 < V1 from visiting the second museum. Because of the declining marginal value of
visits, the two museums compete to some extent. If each museum sets an independent
entry charge, one can check that the equilibrium entry charge is the incremental value
of a second visit, V2. The result is that tourists visit both museums and obtain strictly
positive surplus V1   V2. Suppose next that the two museums are free to choose their own
entry charge but agree in advance to o¤er a discount  on the sum of stand-alone prices
if a tourist visits both museums, and they fund this discount equally. (That is to say, if
museum i chooses the entry fee pi, the charge for visiting both museums is p1 + p2   
and museum i receives revenue pi   12 when a tourist visits both museums.) Since with
a bundle discount  a tourists incremental utility from a second visit is now V2 + , the
equilibrium entry fee with discount   V1   V2 is p = V2 + , with the result that tourists
visit both museums and pay the joint price 2V2+ . In particular, by choosing  = V1 V2
rms can induce the fully collusive outcome.
Thus, the apparently pro-consumer policy of o¤ering a discount for joint purchase can
act as a device to sustain collusion. This suggests that inter-rm discounting schemes
operated by rms supplying substitutable products should be viewed with some suspicion
by antitrust authorities.27
7 Conclusions and Managerial Implications
This paper has extended the standard model of bundling to allow products to be partial
substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Building on the somewhat
neglected paper by Long (1984), simple formulas were derived which governed when a rm
wishes to introduce a bundle discount. With monopoly supply, we typically found that
the rm has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount in at least as many cases as with
the traditional model with additive valuations. Sub-additive preferences give the rm an
27The UK competition authority, the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, has recently developed policy towards multi-
operator travel cards, whereby several travel companies coordinate to provide combined travel tickets. The
authority argued that such multi-operator tickets can provide e¢ ciency gains, but they should only be
permitted under competition law if they do not signicantly eliminate competition. See their press release
on 16 December 2010, at www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/141-10.
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additional reason to o¤er a bundle discount, which is to better target a low price for a
second item at those customers who are inclined (with linear prices) to buy a single item.
We observed that the impact of substitutability could amplify or diminish the size of the
most protable bundle discount.
When products were supplied by separate rms, we found that a rm often has a uni-
lateral incentive to o¤er a joint-purchase discount when their customers buy rival products.
In such cases, inter-rm bundle discounts are achieved without any need for coordination
between suppliers. The two principal situations in which a rm might wish to do this are
(i) when product valuations are negatively correlated in the population of consumers, and
(ii) when products are partial substitutes so that consumption of a rival product reduces
the incremental utility derived from a rms own product. In either case, when a customer
buys another suppliers product, this is bad news about a customers willingness to pay
for a rms product and gives the rm an incentive to cut its price.28 When rms price
discriminate in this manner, we saw that, relative to the uniform pricing regime, a rm
typically raises its price for stand-alone purchase and lowers its price for joint purchase.
In addition, equilibrium prots typically are higher with price discrimination. One reason
why prots rise is that when rms o¤er an inter-rm bundle discount, this mitigates the
innate substitutability of their products, and thus competition is relaxed. In sum, when
conditions (i) or (ii) hold, a rm should consider conditioning its price on whether cus-
tomers also buy products from rival sellers; its prot increases not only if it follows this
strategy in isolation, but also if its rivals follow suit.
Historically, this form of price discrimination was not often observed. In many cases,
in order to condition price on a purchase from a rival supplier, a rm would need a paper
trailsuch as receipt from the rival. One problem with this system is that customers are
then encouraged to visit the rival rm rst, and because of transaction and travel costs, this
might mean that fewer customers would actually come to the rm. A second problem is
that it is hard for two rms to o¤er such discounts, since a customer might have to visit the
rms sequentially. However, these two (related) problems can nowadays often be overcome
when products can be purchased simultaneously, which can be facilitated either by online
buying platforms or by other kinds of product aggregators. For instance, a website could
28We also discussed the situation where some consumers could only buy a single product (e.g., because
of time constraints), and in this case a rm actually has an incentive to raise its price when a customer
buys the rival product.
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be set up which allows tourist attractions in a city to post retail prices which could be
conditioned on which other attractions are chosen. A consumer then constructs her own
bundle in the light of the menu of prices, and pays each attraction its stipulated price.
Alternatively, intermediaries could provide ready-made packages for consumers, with retail
prices based on the bundle-specic wholesale prices o¤ered by sellers. Arrangements of
this kind require no price coordination between rival suppliers. Thus, modern methods of
shopping and paying make it easier for rms to pursue this kind of pricing strategy, and
we may see greater use of it in future.
A more traditional way to implement inter-rm bundling is for rms to coordinate
aspects of their pricing strategy. In this paper I focussed on one particular kind of coordi-
nation, which is where rms agree on a joint purchase discount, and subsequently choose
their prices non-cooperatively. Because a bundle discount mitigates the innate substi-
tutability of rival products, separate sellers can use this mechanism to lessen rivalry in the
market. Thus, rms often have an incentive to explore joint pricing schemes of this form,
and regulators have a corresponding incentive to be wary of such schemes.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2: A type-(v1; v2; vb) consumer buys product 1 if and only if
maxfvb   p1   p2; v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g : (22)
I claim that the di¤erence between the two sides in (22), that is
maxfvb   p1   p2; v1   p1g  maxfv2   p2; 0g ; (23)
is weakly increasing in p2 for all (v1; v2; vb). (This then implies that the set of consumer
types who buy product 1 is increasing, in the set-theoretic sense, in p2, and so the measure
of such consumers is increasing in p2.) The only way in which expression (23) could strictly
decrease with p2 is if
vb   p1   p2 > v1   p1 and v2   p2 < 0 :
However, since products are substitutes we have vb  v1+v2, which implies that the above
pair of inequalities are contradictory. This establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Firm is equilibrium linear price pi maximizes (pi  ci)(qi+ qb),
so that
0 = qi

1  (pi   ci)
 @qi=@pi
qi

+ qb

1  (pi   ci)
 @qb=@pi
qb

: (24)
Suppose now that rm i o¤ers a discount i > 0 from its price pi to those consumers who
purchase product j as well. (Those consumers who only buy product i continue to pay pi .)
Then rm is prot is
i = (p

i   ci)(Qi +Qb)  iQb ; (25)
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and the impact of a small joint purchase discount is governed by the sign of di
di

i=0
, which
from (7) is equal to
 qb   (pi   ci)
@qb
@pi
: (26)
When (13) holds, the second term [] in (24) must be strictly negative, i.e., expression (26)
is strictly positive. Therefore, o¤ering a small discount for joint purchase will raise the
rms prot. 
Proof of Proposition 4: From Figure 3 we see that with linear price p for either product
we have
xb(p) = (1  F (p+ z))	(p+ z) ; xs(p) = (1  F (p))(2 	(p))  xb(p) ;
and so (16) is given by
(p) =
xb(p)
xs(p) + xb(p)
=
(1  F (p+ z))	(p+ z)
(1  F (p))(2 	(p)) :
Di¤erentiating shows that  is strictly decreasing with p if and only if
	0(p)
2 	(p) +
	0(p+ z)
	(p+ z)
<
f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z)  
f(p)
1  F (p) :
Since F is assumed to have an increasing hazard rate, the right-hand side of the above
is non-negative, while if condition (4) holds then the left-hand side is strictly negative.
Therefore,  is strictly decreasing and Proposition 3 implies the result. 
Calculations for Example 3: Suppose that the price for either product on its own is
p and the discount for buying both products is  (so the total charge for the bundle is
2p  ). Assume that 0    p. Then the pattern of demand can be understood with the
help of the Figure 6. Here, in region Ai consumers buy product i = 1; 2 on its own for sure,
in region Bi consumers either buy the bundle or buy product i on its own, and in region
Ci consumers either buy the bundle or nothing (and the superior stand-alone product is
product i).
Consider a point (v1; v2) in region B1. What fraction of these consumers with stand-
alone valuations (v1; v2) buy only product 1? Since v1   p  0 and v1   p  v2   p, it
is clear that the consumer will either buy the bundle or product 1 alone. The consumer
prefers to buy product 1 alone if v1   p  vb   (2p  ). i.e., if vb  v1 + p  . Since for
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these consumers vb is uniformly distributed on the interval [v1; v1 + v2], and v2  p   in
this region, the fraction of these consumers who buy only product 1 is p 
v2
, and the rest
buy the bundle. It follows that the total fraction of consumers (including those in region
A1) who buy only product 1 with these prices is
Q1(p; p; ) = (p  )(1  p) +
ZZ
B1
p  
v2
dv1dv2 :
(The same expression holds for Q2.)
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Figure 6: Pattern of demand in Example 3
Consider next the consumers with stand-alone valuations (v1; v2) which lie in region
C1. Since both v1 < p and v2 < p, the only relevant choice is whether the consumer buys
the bundle or nothing at all. The former is the better option whenever vb  2p  . Since
vb is uniformly distributed on [v1; v1 + v2], and v1  2p     v1 + v2, it follows that a
fraction v1+v2 (2p )
v2
of such consumers will choose the bundle. Therefore, the total fraction
of consumers who buy the bundle (including those in region B1; B2 and C2) is
Qb(p; p; ) = 2
ZZ
B1
v2   (p  )
v2
dv1dv2 +
ZZ
C1
v1 + v2   (2p  )
v2
dv1dv2

:
(The factor 2 is introduced in the above expression include the regions B2 and C2, which
by symmetry are equal to B1 and C1.) These integral expressions for Q1 and Qb can be
written as explicit, if tedious, functions of p and . The linear price which maximizes
industry prot therefore maximizes 2p[Q1(p; p; 0) + Qb(p; p; 0)], while the bundling tari¤
37
which maximizes prot maximizes the expression 2pQ1(p; p; ) + (2p   )Qb(p; p; ), and
these tari¤s are reported in the main text in section 4.
Turning next to the analysis when separate rms supply the two products, note that
given the symmetric single-product price p, rm 1s prot when it chooses unilateral dis-
count 1 and the rival chooses discount 2 is
pQ1(p; p; 1 + 2) + (p  1)Qb(p; p; 1 + 2) ;
and thus the rst-order condition for the symmetric equilibrium discount, given p, can
be derived from the above expressions for Q1 and Qb. However, the calculation of the
equilibrium price p (given aggregate bundle discount ) cannot be deduced from these
expressions, as we need the impact on demand of a rise in the price p1 for product 1 on its
own, keeping p2 = p xed. However, careful examination of the regions in Figure 6 reveals
that
 @Q1
@p1

p1=p2=p
= p   +
Z 1
p 
p  
v
dv ;
 @Qb
@p1

p1=p2=p
=
ZZ
B2
1
v2
dv1dv2 + 2
ZZ
C1
1
v2
dv1dv2 :
Again, these expressions have explicit form, and can be used to derive the equilibrium
stand-alone price p given , which satises the rst-order condition
Q1 +Qb + p
@Q1
@p1
+ (p  1
2
)
@Qb
@p1
= 0 : (27)
The equilibrium linear price is obtained from expression (27) by setting  = 0. The
equilibrium tari¤ with and without bundling are reported in the main text in section 5.
Proof of Proposition 6: From Figure 1, we see that
qi(pi; pj) =
Z 1
pi
Hj(pj j vi)fi(vi)dvi ; qb(pi; pj) =
Z 1
pi
(1 Hj(pj j vi))fi(vi)dvi (28)
and
 @qi
@pi
= Hj(pj j pi)fi(pi) ;  @qb
@pi
= (1 Hj(pj j pi))fi(pi) :
Since Hj is assumed to be strictly increasing in vi, it follows from (28) that
qi(pi; pj) > Hj(pj j pi)(1  Fi(pi)) ; qb(pi; pj) < (1 Hj(pj j pi))(1  Fi(pi))
38
and so
  1
qi
@qi
@pi
<
fi(pi)
1  Fi(pi) <  
1
qb
@qb
@pi
and Proposition 2 implies the result. 
Proof of Proposition 7: If F and f are respectively the c.d.f. and density for each
valuation vi, by examining Figure 3 we see that
 @qb
@p1
= f(p+ z)(1  F (p+ z))
and
 @q1
@p1
= f(p)F (p) +
Z p+z
p
(f(v))2dv
(where these derivatives are evaluated at symmetric prices p1 = p2 = p). At the symmetric
price p we have
qb = (1  F (p+ z))2 ; q1 = 12
 
1  (F (p))2   (1  F (p+ z))2 :
We need to show that inequality (13) holds so that Proposition 2 can be applied.
Since F has an increasing hazard rate in (14), we haveZ p+z
p
(f(v))2dv =
Z p+z
p
f(v)
1  F (v)f(v)(1  F (v))dv
 f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z)
Z p+z
p
f(v)(1  F (v))dv
=
1
2
f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z)
 
(1  F (p))2   (1  F (p+ z))2 :
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for (13) to hold is that
f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z) >
2f(p)F (p) + f(p+z)
1 F (p+z) ((1  F (p))2   (1  F (p+ z))2)
1  (F (p))2   (1  F (p+ z))2
which can be rearranged to give
f(p+ z)
1  F (p+ z) >
f(p)
1  F (p) :
Since F has a strictly increasing hazard rate, the claim is established. 
Proof of Proposition 8: By examining Figure 4, we see that
 @qb
@p1
= f(1  F ) ; qb = (1  F )2
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and
 @q1
@p1
= fF + (1  )
Z 1
p
(f(v))2dv ; q1 = F (1  F ) + 12(1  )(1  F 2)
(where these expressions are evaluated at symmetric prices p1 = p2 = p and the dependence
of f and F on p is suppressed). We need to show that inequality (13) is reversed.
Since F has an increasing hazard rate, we haveZ 1
p
(f(v))2dv =
Z 1
p
f(v)
1  F (v)f(v)(1  F (v))dv
>
f
1  F
Z 1
p
f(v)(1  F (v))dv
= 1
2
f
1  F (1  F )
2
= 1
2
f(1  F ) :
Thus (13) is reversed whenever
f
1  F <
2fF + (1  )f(1  F )
2F (1  F ) + (1  )(1  F 2)
which some rearranging shows to be always the case provided  < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 9: Firm is prot under the proposed joint-pricing scheme is
(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)  12Qb : (29)
The impact of introducing a small  > 0 on rm is equilibrium prot is therefore governed
by the sign of
d
d

(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)  12Qb
	
=0
=
dpi
d
@
@pi
[(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)]

=0;pi=pi
+
dpj
d
@
@pj
[(pi   c)(Qi +Qb)]

=0;pi=pi
(30)
  1
2
Qb

=0
+ (pi   c)
@
@
(Qi +Qb)

=0
=  1
2
qb   (p   c)@qb
@pi
(31)
(where this nal expression is evaluated at optimal linear price p). Here, the terms in line
(30) vanish, the rst because p is the optimal price for rm i when rms choose linear
prices (i.e., pi maximizes (pi c)(qi+qb)), and the second because changing the other rms
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price has no impact on a rms demand when there is no bundling discount (i.e., qi + qb
does not depend on pj when values are additive). The nal expression follows from (7).
Following by-now familiar arguments, the term (31) is strictly positive if and only if (4)
holds.
Consider next the impact of the joint pricing scheme on total welfare. To calculate this
we need to understand how the introduction of  a¤ects equilibrium prices pi. Firm is
prot is given by (29) and so the rst-order condition for pi given  (and pj) is
Qi +Qb + (p  c)@(Qi +Qb)
@pi
  1
2

@Qb
@pi
= 0 : (32)
This expression then determines the symmetric stand-alone price p() as a function of the
discount . Totally di¤erentiating (32) with respect to  yields
0 =
@(Qi +Qb)
@
+ 2p0
@(Qi +Qb)
@pi
+ p0
@(Qi +Qb)
@pj
+(p  c)

@2(Qi +Qb)
@pi@
+ p0
@2(Qi +Qb)
@p2i
+ p0
@2(Qi +Qb)
@pi@pj

  1
2
@Qb
@pi
;
where p0 = d
d
p(). When  = 0 this simplies to
0 =  3
2
@qb
@pi
  2fp0 + (p  c)

 @
2qb
@p2i
  p0f 0

: (33)
Note that
 @qb
@p1
= f(p1)(1 H(p2 j p1))
and so
  @
2qb
@p21

p1=p2=p
= f 0(p)(1 H(p j p))  f(p) @
@p1
H(p2 j p1)
 f 0(p)(1 H(p j p))
=  f
0(p)
f(p)
@qb
@p1
; (34)
where the inequality follows when H(p j v) weakly increases with v. Thus, expression (33)
implies
[2f + (p  c)f 0]p0 =  3
2
@qb
@pi
  (p  c)@
2qb
@p2i
  @qb
@pi

3
2
+
f 0
f
(p  c)

(35)
  @qb
@pi

2 +
f 0
f
(p  c)

=   1
f
@qb
@pi
[2f + f 0(p  c)] :
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Here, the rst inequality follows from (34), and the second follows from the fact that @qb
@pi
is negative. Since the term [2f + f 0(p  c)] is strictly positive due to the second-order
condition for p to be the equilibrium price when  = 0 (the second-order condition is sure
to be satised given (14)), we deduce that
fp0   @qb
@pi
: (36)
By inspecting Figure 5, one can see that the impact of a small discount  on total
welfare is equal to
W 0 = 2f(p)(p  c) f(1 H(p j p))(1  p0) H(p j p)p0g :
(Here, the rst term represents the welfare gain when more single-item consumers buy two
items, as the incremental cost of the second item falls to p()   , while the second term
represents the welfare loss when some single-item consumers decide to buy nothing due to
the price rising to p().) This welfare change has the sign of
f f1 H   p0g =  @qb
@pi
  fp0  0 ;
where the inequality follows from (36). Thus, when H(p j v) weakly increases with v, the
joint pricing scheme will increase total welfare when  is small. 
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